The Changing Nature and Role of Tactical Asset Allocation Max Darnell Partner and Chief Investment Officer First Quadrant, L.P. Pasadena, California lobal tactical asset allocation (GTAA), also frequently referred to as "global macro," has received a sizable inflow of assets in recent years. The most obvious explanation for this phenomenon is that returns to the strategy have been good, which is indeed true, but there is more to the story. The investment industry has been undergoing a revolution or, at least, a significant evolution over the course of this decade. Hedge funds, liability-driven investing, portable alpha, and commodities offer evidence of these industry changes, and the themes that bind them together are threefold. Global macro is a product of these themes as well.
Three Themes Underlying Global Macro Strategies
The first theme underlying the evolution in investment strategies and instruments is the rationalization of investment constraints. This rationalization can take one of two forms-the constraint arises from either an investment rationale or from an exogenous source. A constraint based on an investment rationale is intended to help an investor meet investment objectives, whereas an exogenous constraint could be cultural or arise from an institutional friction, such as a prohibition against taking short positions or using derivatives. Releasing managers from these constraints has led to a broader acceptance of more esoteric strategies, such as portable alpha, and investment vehicles, such as derivatives. The fact that hedge funds do not have the same onerous constraints placed on them that traditional investment managers do is well known and has led irrefutably to their popularity. Another example is the 130/30 portfolio (130 percent long/30 percent short), which is a harbinger of increasing openness on the part of investors toward more relaxed constraints. The way is clear for more true global mandates. Global equity mandates are increasingly inclusive of the entire global opportunity set and are no longer limited to specific sectors, countries, or regions. No investment product is freer of investment constraints than global macro. Although global macro has been around since at least 1928 when Keynes began to run the King's College endowment, it became most visible when George Soros began running global macro in 1969 and received a significant bump in visibility when Soros made a huge (roughly $1 billion) short bet on the British pound in September 1992. Despite that long history, the industry is just now accepting and adopting a broader, unconstrained approach.
The second theme is the introduction of liabilitydriven risk into the asset allocation equation. For years, the pension fund industry had a return-based orientation to liabilities; that is, the returns on the assets were required to be sufficient to cover fund liabilities. Of course, with the divergence recently experienced between asset performance and liability growth, the industry has been reminded that, in Tactical asset allocation (TAA) has evolved over the last two decades from a purely domestic, single-decision strategy to a complex, global, multistrategy approach known as "global TAA" or "global macro." It produces uncorrelated alpha and is scalable. As a consequence, global macro is attracting pension funds and other institutional assets in increasing numbers. The Changing Nature and Role of Tactical Asset Allocation terms of liabilities vis-à-vis assets, risk matters, too. Funds in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavian countries have already moved to remedy this shortcoming of traditional pension fund management, and funds in the United States are beginning to follow suit.
The new emphasis on liability-driven investing has caused investors to begin hedging their liabilities, and of course, derivatives are the hedging tool. Liability-driven investing has encouraged the use of such asset classes as commodities and long-duration infrastructure investments. Dutch investors, after hedging their liabilities over a period of time, have determined that, as Leibowitz, Bader, and Kogelman (1992) observed, a lot of risk can remain in a supposedly hedged portfolio. Leibowitz et al. suggested that as much as a very substantial 15 percent error could exist in attempts to hedge away the uncertainty associated with demographics, mortality rates, and so forth. To address this unmitigated risk, fund managers have begun to look at ways their portfolio assets can be used to generate uncorrelated, alternative forms of beta as well as alpha sources with large capacity. This interest explains the initial attraction to hedge funds because they are largely alternative forms of beta as well as sources of alpha. But the main requirement of institutional asset managers is that alpha should be scalable; it must accommodate the demands of great capacity. Hedge funds cannot offer unlimited capacity. So, the best way to gain scalable alpha is to find a product that uses the largest, most liquid markets in the world, and that is GTAA, or global macro.
The third, more controversial, theme is the rise of entrepreneurial investing. For a quarter century, those who provided capital were in a privileged position. Returns to passive investing were excellent. From today's vantage point, however, that privilege appears to have disappeared. Whether it is viewed as a global saving glut or as an excess of liquidity globally, the implication is that the supply of capital is high and the returns to capital will be low. Passive lending-whether that means buying equities, bonds, or any other asset-seems unlikely to deliver the returns of the recent past.
A more entrepreneurial approach to investing will be required if one wants or needs to boost returns. Entrepreneurial alphas may be found, for example, in the private equity world. Activist investing, such as what some of the larger institutional investors are engaged in, is a similar sort of phenomenon that has been shown to add value over time. Large pension funds are now looking beyond just buying infrastructure to finding opportunities to finance and create new infrastructure-in other words, to be entrepreneurial. Being entrepreneurial is essentially being opportunistic, which is a characteristic rarely found in investment strategies outside global macro.
Ultimately, GTAA takes a very opportunistic approach because it is a product of these three themes. Even just a decade ago, the industry was largely uncomfortable with a broad, unconstrained investment strategy, but now, it is breaking out of its shell. Provided they have the skill to do so, managers should now be able to harness portfolio assets and use them more flexibly in more opportunistic ways to produce consistent excess return.
Different Views on Tactical Asset Allocation
Practitioners apply varying market views in their approaches to tactical asset allocation (TAA). The four quadrants depicted in Figure 1 explain how these approaches differ and why.
The horizontal axis in the figure represents how managers think or the kind of ideas they bring to the table. At one end of the spectrum are managers who bring a statistical or technical orientation to the table. At the other end are more rationally, intuitively, or theoretically driven managers. The vertical axis represents the manner in which the manager applies his or her ideas, ranging from a strictly systematic approach to a fully discretionary approach. Conceptually, this framework works well to describe the world of investment managers where they are differentiated based on two spectrums-from systematic to discretionary and from technical to theory based. This discussion does not imply any sort of hierarchy or judgment about the categories but only that their different approaches create some significant differences in the return that each generates. Classic global macro managers, such as Soros and Julian Robertson, fall in the southeast quadrant of Figure 1 , heavily governed by a theoretical, discretionary approach. Until recently, global macro did not enjoy wide acceptance in the institutional world for a couple of reasons. First, because global macro was both unconstrained and unsystematic, investors were unsure which direction it would take next; its past was not a reliable predictor of its future. Second, the strategy was highly concentrated. Most global macro portfolios run in the classic discretionary style are driven by an idea or two at each point in time. Such managers can sometimes use a few ideas concurrently, but these managers are rarely able to initiate a lot of good, innovative ideas all at the same time. It is not a critique of them; it is just a consequence of the discretionary approach. Thus, this concentration presents a risk that the institutional world has found unappealing.
In response, an institutional style of global macro has been created that falls in the northeast quadrant of Figure 1 , where managers have brought a systematic approach to global macro and developed a multistrategy characteristic that addresses the concentration risk that institutional clients have objected to. These portfolios are highly diversified in terms of alpha source and bring all the modern risk management tools to bear on their management. These are very different types of portfolios, and it is the area where huge growth in GTAA allocations has occurred.
In the northwest quadrant of the figure are commodity trading advisers (CTAs) and managed futures players. Their approach uses many of the same instruments as global macro, but these managers follow a very statistical, systematic strategy. Certainly, CTAs and managed futures players have generated some interesting and appealing return characteristics, but they also tend to be more highly correlated with each other. The MLM Index does a good job of capturing the return in that space and indicates that something systematic is at play. Contrast this area to the active managers in the northeast space, the multistrategy TAA managers who have very low correlations (as low as 20-40 percent) with each other, which, obviously, is an attractive and rare feature. Large-capitalization U.S. equity managers tend to generate alphas with 60-80 percent correlations. Convertible arbitrage (arb) managers tend to have a correlation of about 60 percent with their peers, whereas merger arb managers have a shared correlation closer to 70 percent. The very low correlations of multistrategy TAA managers create a lot of opportunity for multi-manager-type portfolios and are thus in demand by an increasingly large number of funds.
Evolution of Global Macro
The path that First Quadrant followed is representative of the history and evolution of global macro strategies. Figure 2 highlights the years when new strategies and instruments were introduced into the TAA space. Although this timeline begins in the late 1980s, TAA can trace its roots back to the early 1970s under Bill Foust at Wells Fargo. As one can see, global macro has been around for a long time but is just now coming into its own.
First Quadrant and others entered the TAA space in the 1980s with a domestic TAA strategy. Domestic TAA is basically just one decisionwhether to invest in domestic stocks or bonds, although cash is available as a defensive alternative asset-and its goal is to capture the inefficiencies specifically related to the relative performance of stocks and bonds. The next step in the evolutionary The Changing Nature and Role of Tactical Asset Allocation process was global TAA, which simply takes the domestic TAA decision and spreads it across multiple markets for greater diversification. Whether explicit or implicit, the driver of the majority of the returns in the earliest global TAA strategies was global stock versus global bond performance, even if managers thought they were exploiting domestic differences in return between stocks and bonds. Some markets, however-like Japan-behaved very differently from the others, so making the TAA decision in multiple places did provide some diversification value over a domestic TAA strategy, but not a lot. Therefore, global TAA, like its predecessor domestic TAA, is really a single-strategy productan asset class tilting strategy. In 1992, the currency decision was layered on. The power of joining two strategies-currency and asset class-that have relatively low alpha correlation gave a nice boost to the GTAA information ratio (IR).
Tactical options and long-short mandates appeared in 1995, and in the late 1990s, independent country selection decisions began to be made. This was an important shift from the earlier work where within the context of independent country selection, if a manager liked stocks better than bonds in Japan but bonds better than stocks in the United States, the result was an implied relative bet on Japanese stocks versus U.S. stocks. Such bets had nothing to do with an explicit decision about how Japanese stocks might perform relative to U.S. stocks; the implied bets were, in effect, an unintended by-product of the asset class selection process. Because early on independent country selection did not seek market inefficiencies that might have related specifically to the country market/sector decision, they were substantially less effective and provided less diversification because they were a product of the asset class decision.
As a result, in the late 1990s, managers started to build explicit models to capture relative performance within the equity and fixed-income asset classes and to build explicit strategies that relied on the inefficiencies in different markets. The result was that a manager could pursue four or five strategies at once. Next, volatility was built into the TAA approach and was treated as its own asset class, which provided a wonderful complement to the stock-bond decision. The result was that managers' TAA approaches encompassed four basic decisions-asset class, currency, stock market, and bond market.
Over the last 20 years, three main transitions in TAA have been made. The first was the transition from a domestic to a global mandate, the second was from an overlay objective to an alpha objective, and the third was to a less constrained global macro approach that includes long-short investing. Gradually, investors were giving managers increased freedom to allocate risk between each of the strategies that they used (e.g., shifting risk among currency, asset class, stock-country selection, and bond-country selection strategies), thus releasing them from the investment constraints that had bound them until that point. Now, TAA is a global macro product that gives managers a great deal of freedom and access to many markets.
Evolution in the Application of TAA
As TAA strategies evolved and developed over the last two decades, one of the biggest changes was the way active risk is used in the portfolio. In conventional long-only overlay strategies, portfolios tend to be highly concentrated in the largest-cap, or largest-GDP, markets because those are the only markets in which the manager has room to maneuver. This situation is similar to the concentration problem experienced by investors in the S&P 500 Index stock universe, where, in a long-only portfolio, most of the active risk tends to be in the biggest names because those are the only names with sufficient size to underweight. The same principle holds true for global TAA long-only overlay strategies; in the early years, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan tended to dominate the active risk in GTAA portfolios. The downside was that these portfolios did not have much breadth.
The solution was to give the manager the ability to short the market. However, risk continued to be constrained by countries, ignoring the differences in stock, bond, and currency risk. So, long-short strategies became more equally diversified across countries but remained overly focused on asset-class and stock country decisions where return variances are higher than they are for bond-country selection and currency. Mandates typically defined constraints according to dollars rather than risk, so bonds (bondcountry selection) were usually underweighted in the risk equation because to get the same amount of risk from bonds as from stocks, bonds require three times the dollar investment that stocks do.
With the alpha-focused, or global macro, approach, however, the manager has gained much more freedom. Strategic allocations of risk are allowed to be made across all four (or more) embedded strategies-bond-country, stock-country, currency, and asset-class decisions-and the risk allocation can be tactically shifted to markets and sectors where opportunities exist. In theory, if a particular market experiences an over-the-top year, most global macro managers will add value from that market in that year and shift the next year to another market or sector where opportunity
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remains to be exploited. Global macro managers have the flexibility to move active risk among markets as their supporting analytics and research indicate are appropriate. Such flexibility has been very important in generating ever better returns in the GTAA product.
A stylized example of the consequences resulting from the long-short overlay point in the evolution of TAA can be found in the pie charts in Figure  3 . Panel A shows that the active risk is concentrated in asset-class and stock-country selection, which results from the equal active dollar allocation depicted in Panel B. (Remember, bonds are less volatile than the other categories.) These strategies typically generate an IR of 0.3-0.4, which is quite respectable for a highly constrained type of mandate.
In order to add value, investors must be prepared to exploit market inefficiencies. But all inefficiencies go through phases of expansion and contraction. To be successful, therefore, they must first develop access to a broad set of uncorrelated sources of alpha (i.e., they must have "breadth"). Then, they must be prepared to tactically shift risk toward those assets where the opportunities are most significant and away from those where the opportunities are largely depleted. Finally, recognizing that competition will exhaust the alpha embedded in the market inefficiencies, they must continually seek new sources of uncorrelated alpha and be prepared to cast a broad net to detect any new market inefficiencies. The Changing Nature and Role of Tactical Asset Allocation Figure 4 illustrates how important breadth (or the number of independent sources of alpha) is to the success of global macro strategies. To generate this figure, we combed through data from January 1990 to December 2006 to select the strategies with the lowest correlations. Be aware that, in practice, realized correlations are typically slightly higher than historical data would indicate. Also, correlations in financial markets are normally not as stable as the figure portrays.
This figure shows that within the four common strategies (asset-class, stock-country, bond-country, and currency selection), 23 different alpha engines are at work. Across all of the 253 inefficiency pairs within those 23 inefficiencies, the correlations are not only, on average, zero, but each also stays very close to zero.
One aspect of TAA that has long been misunderstood is that what matters to the end investor should be the marginal breadth the manager or strategy brings to the investor's overall fund, not the stand-alone measure of breadth of the strategy or manager. Thus, that classic, discretionary global macro manager I spoke of earlier who may be running just one to three bets in his portfolio is not necessarily suffering from a lack of breadth from the perspective of the end investor if the alpha generated brings a unique idiosyncratic alpha to the investor's portfolio. Even if the manager represents a single decision, if that decision adds breadth to the investor's portfolio, it should be welcomed. In fact, it is extremely challenging to find enough managers who can offer marginal breadth to a portfolio.
Combining strategies with low correlations with each other (and with each strategy having an expected IR of 0.3-0.5) generates a much improved IR. For example, combining five strategies might produce an IR above 1 if those strategies are uncorrelated, as shown in Figure 4 . Using such a multistrategy approach as global macro reasonably produces a very high IR because of the many different independent sources of alpha assembled together. From a practical standpoint, however, the number of new sources of uncorrelated alpha naturally has a limit. Practically speaking, there are only so many uncorrelated features in the universe of financial assets. New alpha sources can be located, but because they are correlated with alpha sources already in the investor's portfolio, they are of limited benefit to the portfolio and not worth pursuing. This is a practical limitation to the potential of all investment strategies.
Reasons for Asset Growth in Global Macro
The substantial asset growth in global macro strategies is attributable to several factors. One factor is that global macro is a self-contained approach for dealing with a multiple-strategy portfolio. In addition, positions, risk, and process are transparent; investors have a high comfort level with direct evaluation of managers; it is fee advantaged; liquidity and capacity associated with the strategy are high; and its alpha is attractive relative to other available investment strategies. Let me explain what I mean by self-contained. A pension fund or a fund of funds may find it difficult to move assets from one external manager to another as conditions change. But when a multiple-strategy approach is run under one roof, all the right incentives are in place to take full advantage of being opportunistic and moving risk around at the margin.
The transparency of the global macro product is enormously high. Long price histories and good information on the risk-return characteristics of the stocks, bonds, currencies, stock/bond index options, and commodities used in the strategies are widely available, making execution straightforward and facilitating communication with investors about the elements of the strategy. Because the industry's understanding of the components of and processes associated with global macro is high relative to that of other investment strategies, investors are comfortable overseeing their managed assets. And certainly, transparent pricing adds to a high level of buyer comfort with these strategies, as well. Also, the players in the strategy typically tend to be well known and come with significant reputational capital to protect-an obvious and significant benefit for the clients.
Global macro enjoys a fee advantage over some other multiple-strategy approaches. In a fund-offunds model, the investor pays a base fee plus a performance fee (if earned) to the manager of each of the different strategies in the portfolio. Under these circumstances, the result will sometimes be that the investor must pay a performance fee to the managers who have outperformed even if the entire portfolio has underperformed. In contrast, when fees are based on total portfolio performance-as it is in a multistrategy firm-investors pay a performance fee only when the total portfolio earns it. At the same time, the investor retains the benefit of the low correlations associated with the multiple-strategy approach. This combination results in a higher IR.
The majority of global macro strategies focus on the world's most liquid markets, so global macro enjoys a favorable capacity situation. Furthermore, the alpha of global macro can be viewed favorably because of its low correlations with other investment strategies.
Finally, global macro has competitively delivered the goods on providing alpha that has a low correlation with beta. The long-term expectation is that global macro will deliver a zero or near-zero beta. Over the recent live history, global macro managers have delivered a positive beta but one lower than that of other competitive strategies. For example, the solid line in Figure 5 graphs the rolling 36-month correlation of the Hedge Fund Research Index (HFRI) relative to the MSCI EAFE Index. Since December 1992, the beta exposure in funds of funds relative to the equity market has steadily risen until, in December 2006, it reached a high point for the tracking period. The correlation at the beginning of the tracking period was around -0.2, but by December 2006, it had crept up to 0.9-a significant increase-suggesting that hedge funds, which are a The Changing Nature and Role of Tactical Asset Allocation primary source of alpha for large investors, no longer offer the risk diversification they once did versus the stock market. Although many factors may have contributed to this increase in correlation between hedge funds and the equity market (as measured by EAFE), bear in mind that, generally speaking, this has been a time of strong equity market performance. In contrast, the dotted line in Figure 5 plots the 36-month rolling correlation between EAFE and a global macro simulation. Notice that the two sets of correlations are reasonable complements to each other in that when one rises, the other tends to fall. Also, note that in December 2006, the correlation between EAFE and global macro was fairly low compared with the correlation of EAFE with funds of funds, which was at its peak. If, as many believe, we are looking ahead to a more difficult return environment, then the capacity to increase short exposure in global macro portfolios (which they were structurally designed to allow for) should prove favorable for returns to global macro strategies. At the same time, global macro retains the ability to benefit from favorable equity market conditions. All of these traits have contributed to attracting a wide range of investors to the strategy.
Conclusion
The point I would like to drive home is that the TAA product itself has changed dramatically since it made its first appearance in the early 1970s. The product that TAA has evolved into today, global macro, is meeting the needs of a wide range of investors. The spirit of global macro lies in its very opportunistic investing style. The self-contained, multiple-strategy approach is flexible and unconstrained, is designed to combine uncorrelated sources of alpha, and is executable at lower fees, which raises the effective return to the investor. These benefits are not lost on investors who are readily adopting the strategy and placing more assets in global macro.
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